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INTRODUCTION
The bazaars in the city of Banaras provide an especially good test
case for considering the topic at hand: Corporate Capitalism and the City
of God.
First, the city of Banaras, located in the North Indian state of Uttar
Pradesh on the banks of the Ganges River, is truly the City of God—or at
least the city of one god in particular. Banaras—also known as Varanasi
and Kashi—is thought by many to be the earthly abode of Lord Shiva as
well as the axis mundi that connects the human and divine worlds.
Banaras, it is said, sits on the three prongs of Lord Shiva’s trident, thus
allowing for a unique intermingling in the city of the mundane and divine.
Banaras is, quite simply, Lord Shiva’s city, and it has been recognized as
such for millennia.1
Second, Banaras has likewise been a center for commerce for
millennia, with business and religion, and the inevitable business of
religion, making it an important destination for merchants and pilgrims.2
Banaras first achieved renown as a center for fine fabrics and a hub for
* Smith College. My thanks to the organizers and participants of the Berle XII symposium for their
thoughtful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the Law Review’s
editorial team for their diligence and professionalism.
1. See generally Diana Eck, Banaras: City of Light (1982); Jonathan Parry, Death in Banaras
11–32 (1994).
2. See generally Hans Bakker, Construction and Reconstruction of Sacred Space in Vārāṇasī,
43 NUMEN 32 (1996).
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trade.3 In the eighteenth century it became “the subcontinent’s inland
commercial capital,”4 with its bankers functioning as the proverbial Wall
Street of its day. Even today the city is an important commercial hub,
producing and disseminating a wide variety of goods and services for
much of North India.
My interest is in the way that Banaras offers a challenge to normative
views of “corporate capitalism,” both in terms of how it is practiced in the
city and the rules that govern it. Elsewhere I have discussed the former,
focusing on ways that the bazaars of Banaras function as a “series of
ongoing and socially embedded networks that are the mechanisms for the
exchange of specific commodities,”5 while also recognizing the ways
these bazaars are moralized and moralizing entities with concomitant
institutions, value systems, and products.6 In this article, I discuss the
latter, focusing on the legal system that is mobilized to guide commercial
exchange and daily life in the bazaars of Banaras, this legal system’s
relationship to the city’s courts and police, and the relationship between
these two justice systems and the kinds of justice they deliver.
So why does this matter? The bazaars of Banaras, as well as those
throughout much of India, have long functioned as complex ecosystems,
with individuals coming together in networks based on a shared trust rather
than on a shared ethnicity, class, caste, or religion. These heterogeneous
networks have stood as both a bulwark against communal violence and a
testament to the power and possibility of participatory self-governance.7
Better understanding the legal system that governs the bazaar and its
networks, and the ways that trust can be cultivated, violence avoided, and
civility and compromise incentivized, might just help us better understand
how to make India, and perhaps elsewhere, more inclusive and
egalitarian.8
In what follows, I offer an overview of India’s courts and police as a
way of assessing the limitations of India’s criminal justice system and
3. P. NAYAK, T.K. ROUT & SHAKEEL SHAIKH RAJANIKANT, MINISTRY OF COM. & INDUS.,
GOV’T OF INDIA, DREAM WEAVING: STUDY & DOCUMENTATION OF BANARAS SAREES AND
BROCADES 1–3 (2007), http://textilescommittee.nic.in/sites/default/files/banaras.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KP6PZCMF].
4. CHRISTOPHER ALAN BAYLY, RULERS, TOWNSMEN AND BAZAARS: NORTH INDIAN SOCIETY
IN THE AGE OF BRITISH EXPANSION 1770–1870, at 126 (1998).
5. ARANG KESHAVARZIAN, BAZAAR AND STATE IN IRAN: THE POLITICS OF THE TEHRAN
MARKETPLACE 70 (2007).
6. Andy Rotman, Brandism vs. Bazaarism: Mediating Divinity in Banaras, in RETHINKING
MARKETS IN MODERN INDIA: EMBEDDED EXCHANGE AND CONTESTED JURISDICTION 234, 241 (Ajay
Gandhi, Barbara Harriss-White, Douglas E. Haynes & Sebastian Schwecke eds., 2020).
7. Id. at 257–61.
8. See generally NATASHA BEHL, GENDERED CITIZENSHIP: UNDERSTANDING GENDERED
VIOLENCE IN DEMOCRATIC INDIA (2019).
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offering context for the flourishing of India’s bazaar law system,
especially in Banaras. My observations and insights come from academic
writing on these topics as well as from more than two decades of
ethnographic research in Banaras. Since 2001, I have interviewed
hundreds of merchants and consumers, religious leaders and devotees,
pilgrims, politicians, and police officers, often repeatedly, in an effort to
understand the complex and constitutive relationship in the bazaar
between morals and markets and how these interactive and evolving
systems affect the social life of the city. Over the years, many of my
informants have become friends and teachers, and their insights inform
much of what follows.
I. SLOW COURTS, POLICE GAMESMANSHIP, AND JUGAAD JUSTICE
Almost everyone in Banaras tries to avoid relying on the courts to
adjudicate a commercial dispute, or almost any dispute for that matter. The
Indian court system is impressively congested with more than 30 million
cases currently pending in district and subordinate courts, more than 4
million cases in the high courts, and roughly 65,000 in the Supreme Court.9
In 2010, one High Court Justice estimated that at the current rate this
backlog would take 320 years to clear, and in the intervening years the
backlog has only increased.10 According to the World Bank’s “Doing
Business” indicators for “Enforcing Contracts,” it is estimated that in India
to resolve a hypothetical commercial dispute through a local first-instance
court would take 1,445 days, making it the fifth slowest of the 190
countries measured.11
Considering the enormous delays in the court system, individuals
often rely on the courts less to dispense justice than to torment one’s
adversaries, bogging them down in prolonged legal wrangling.12 The
anthropologist Bernard Cohn’s assessment from the 1960s, based on his
study of a village that borders Banaras, is still apt:
The use of the courts for settlement of local disputes seems in most
villages to be almost a minor one. In Senapur, courts were and are
9. Kaushik Deka, On India’s Judiciary: Bogged by a Backlog, INDIA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/20210208-bogged-by-a-backlog-1763840-202101-30 [https://perma.cc/W2M5-934L].
10. Amrit Amirapu, Justice Delayed is Growth Denied: The Effect of Slow Courts on
Relationship-Specific Industries in India 3 (Univ. of Kent Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 1706,
2017).
11. See Enforcing Contracts, DOING BUSINESS (May 2020), www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/
exploretopics/enforcing-contracts [https://perma.cc/FCB4-77QS].
12. See generally Jolie M. F. Wood, Contentious Politics and Civil Society in Varanasi, in
REFRAMING DEMOCRACY AND AGENCY: INTERROGATING POLITICAL SOCIETY 93 (Ajay Gudavarthy
ed., 2012).
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used as an arena in the competition for social status, and for political
and economic dominance in the village. Cases are brought to court to
harass one’s opponents, as a punishment, as a form of land
speculation and profit making, to satisfy insulted pride, and to
maintain local political dominance over one’s followers. The litigants
do not expect a settlement that will end the dispute to eventuate from
recourse to the state courts.13

Robert Moog conducted research on the court system in Banaras in
the 1980s and 1990s and concurs with Cohn, citing numerous others who
do as well. According to Moog:
The situation I observed in Varanasi appeared to be no different.
Attorneys, judges, and litigants often cited defense of izzat (honor),
harassment, and speculation as reasons for filing with the courts.
Harassment and speculation often translate into extending the case as
long as necessary to crush the opposite party or have him/ her submit.
Delays
are
an
inherent
part
of
the
strategy.14

For many people, the utility of the Indian courts is predicated on the
fact that they are slow and can be made even slower. Slowness facilitates
the perception that the proceedings are burdensome. This burdensomeness
can be wielded to punish one’s adversaries, inflicting on them the penalty
of having to go to court and suffer various forms of tediousness and
uncertainty, as well as possible legal censure. This is slowness by design,
or at least slowness by consent.
Police are likewise to be avoided in Banaras but for quite different
reasons. While the courts are akin to playing fields—sites for a plodding
and grinding competition, with honor as the sport15—the police are more
enigmatic. Encounters with police are like playing a game with evershifting alliances and rules, and one in which everyone’s agency and
authority is provisional at best. It is a game filled with danger and
uncertainty for everyone involved. While one might choose to go to court
hoping to win against a rival, almost everyone “will take pains to avoid
the police, expressing fears that they will at best receive no help from
13. Bernard Cohn, Anthropological Notes on Disputes and Law in India, 67 AM. ANTHRO. 82,
105 (1965).
14. Robert S. Moog, Conflict and Compromise: The Politics of Lok Adalats in Varanasi District,
25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 545, 551 (1991) (footnote omitted); Robert Moog, Delays in the Indian Courts:
Why the Judges Don’t Take Control, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 19, 27 (1992) (“In Varanasi and Deoria, it was
not uncommon for both advocates and judges to comment that in every case at least one of the parties
is interested in delaying the matter, thus providing advocates with a selfless rationale for extending
cases.”).
15. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Sense of Honour, in ALGERIA 1960, at 95 (1979).
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feckless or indifferent police officers, and at worst experience coercive
harassment.”16 Police constables, who constitute roughly 85% of the
police force in each state,17 have been described as a “despised minority,”18
which is how the police are generally viewed in Banaras. I have heard
them compared to blood-sucking parasites, thriving at the expense of
others, exploiting them for personal gain and giving nothing in return. And
I have heard much worse.
Beatrice Jauregui, who has written extensively on the police in North
India, argues that police are systematically disempowered and
delegitimized by both design and practice. As such, they have only a
“provisional authority,” which is “fundamentally interdependent with the
demands of various others who may express provisional authority
themselves.”19 Everyone’s agency and authority are in flux, such that
justice isn’t served but rather continually negotiated.
In 2009, Human Rights Watch released a report about the Indian
police called Broken System, which chronicles some of the implications of
the systemic and systematic disempowerment of the police, especially in
and around Banaras. For example, police constables are minimally trained,
chronically underpaid, and posted far away from their homes, which is
intended to prevent them from mobilizing their resources for illicit
purposes but also deprives them of local support.20 Many of them live in
cramped, dilapidated barracks with fewer beds than occupants. At one
Banaras police station, four constables shared a single bed in a small
room.21 And constables are required to be available for duty twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week, with many working more than twelve
hours a day with no days off.22 The report features numerous interviews
with police officers from Banaras who make assessments like this one:
We are being exploited. I have to work for 24 hours but I get the wage
of a chaprasi [messenger]. I don’t get any leave. My meals are
unhealthy and below caloric value. There is no fixed time for meals,
sometimes we just get [meals] at nine, sometimes at 12. It’s just like
I’m a prisoner. We are suffocating here. I feel like it’s still the British
Empire. There [are] no medical facilities, no toilet. The funds
16. Beatrice Jauregui, Beatings, Beacons, and Big Men: Police Disempowerment and
Delegitimation in India, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 643, 645 (2013).
17. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BROKEN SYSTEM: DYSFUNCTION, ABUSE, AND IMPUNITY IN THE
INDIAN POLICE 7 (2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/08/04/broken-system/dysfunction-abuseand-impunity-indian-police [https://perma.cc/B86M-ADKZ].
18. UPENDRA BAXI, THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 86 (1982).
19. BEATRICE JAUREGUI, PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY: POLICE, ORDER AND SECURITY IN INDIA
14 (2016) [hereinafter PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY].
20. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 34
21. Id. at 34.
22. Id. at 29.
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allocated by the government to constables are taken away by the
superiors. You don’t understand the trauma of being here . . . I took
three days’ medical leave and had 25 days’ salary deducted.23

According to the report, the Director-General of Police in Uttar
Pradesh boasted to them, “If you brought a US policeman here[,] he’d
commit suicide within one day. [Here], you are literally thrown against the
wall. We don’t have a shift of 8 to 10 hours, it is the system we have: we
work 24 hours a day.”24
One of the constables that Jauregui interviewed, recognizing the
ways that the police are simultaneously disenfranchised and pressured,
offered this pithy assessment: “This job is exploitation in the name of
discipline.”25 As such, Jauregui argues, it isn’t an exaggeration to classify
the burdens placed on these officer as “human rights abuses against
police.”26
Indian police are in a precarious financial position. Police officers
are underpaid, with a constable’s pay hovering at the poverty line,27 and
police departments are under-resourced, without enough money for basic
operating expenses.28 As a result, the police invariably rely on various
forms of bribery, like payoffs and protection payments, to supplement
their individual incomes, with “a significant portion” of this money going
into their department’s kitty for mundane expenses, like office supplies
and petrol.29 But police generally have to pay hefty bribes to get their
positions in the first place—the proverbial “pay to play” that is so
normalized one might think of these as “fees” rather than “bribes.” So,
many police are saddled with jobs that pay them subsistence wages and
also require them to contribute to basic operating expenses at work, and
are saddled too with debts to sponsors or moneylenders that are accruing
interest. All this incentivizes them to seek out bribes so that they can
survive, and maybe even thrive, as well as repay the debt from the bribes
that they themselves have paid.30
This world of bribery is part of a larger social system that both
justifies and perpetuates the position of the police as both fearsome and
23. Id. at 35.
24. Id. at 7.
25. PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 19, at 111.
26. Id. at 109.
27. Id. at 166.
28. COMMON CAUSE & LOKNITI, STATUS OF POLICING IN INDIA REPORT 2019: POLICE
ADEQUACY AND WORKING CONDITIONS 62–78 (2019), https://www.lokniti.org/media/upload_files
/SPIR%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQC8-55GR].
29. PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 19, at 45.
30. Id. at 49; Deepak Gidwani, Pay and Get Your Choice Posting in Uttar Police, DAILY NEWS
& ANALYSIS INDIA (June 11, 2015), https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-pay-and-get-your-choiceposting-in-uttar-padesh-police-2094347 [https://perma.cc/7WM4-92AH].
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feckless. The system is constituted such that police must rely on bribes for
their personal and professional well-being, and yet soliciting bribes
undermines the authority of the police as trustworthy arbiters and
custodians of the law. Instead, the police are often seen as opportunists
with a vested interest in both exploiting the law for personal gain and
making sure that citizens continue to break the law so the police can collect
bribes from them for those infractions. Police are often viewed as fostering
an unjust system in which citizens must break the law to survive, for a
fully law-abiding public wouldn’t provide the police with the bribes that
they so desperately need.31
But the police are, as Jauregui argues, both disempowered and
delegitimized, which means that the authority they wield is neither
sovereign nor immutable; it is, instead, provisional and variable, deeply
dependent on condition and circumstance and fluctuating accordingly.
Furthermore, this authority is opaque. As a senior police officer explained
to Jauregui, “your authority comes from your resources,”32 and yet no one
is ever quite sure of one’s own resources or the resources of others. There
is a kind of “resource opacity,” meaning that one has hunches about the
power of an individual’s resources but is never sure until they are put to
the test. The police, as such, are constantly trying to accrue more resources
and various forms of capital while simultaneously testing and modulating
their authority with the public, commanding officers, and politicians.
Authority, in other words, is constantly being negotiated.
Just as the authority of the police is provisional, variable, and opaque,
so too is the law they enforce. The police, as Jauregui observes, “routinely
and inevitably transgress and even transmogrify an imaginary line
delimiting moral and legal right that is itself a moving target.”33 What
counts as legal and illegal is conditioned by authority and circumstance,
both of which are in flux. The law, in practice, shape-shifts, mutating
according to forces seen and unseen. In the words of one of the constables
interviewed by Jauregui, “A little bit of dishonesty benefits
everyone . . . the victims, the judges, the police . . . sometimes even the
criminals. Therefore, it is not wrong.”34
While such logic can be used to rationalize flagrantly extralegal
measures, like torture, it more often is used for what Jauregui refers to as
a jugaad approach to justice.35 The term jugaad refers to a frugally
innovative method of problem-solving, a kind of thrifty virtuosity that
31. PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 19, at 153–57.
32. Id. at 137, 158.
33. Id. at 104.
34. Id. at 51, 91.
35. Id. at 49–56.
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exemplifies the savvy ways that the under-resourced do the needful to get
a job done. In a world of shifting moral economies, jugaad allows for one
to straddle the “imaginary line delimiting moral and legal right,” turning
corruption into a kind of virtuosity.36 The term is especially common in
Banaras, where one is frequently forced to make do with makeshift
measures because of a lack of resources, and where jugaad is something
like a local art form.
This configuration of police authority and the law, and the jugaad
approach to justice that it engenders, creates a situation in which police are
routinely posturing and bluffing. Police encounters with the public are
often like a card game, with everyone engaged in some honest recognition
of their own holdings and those of others, while also trying exploit others’
weaknesses. The police, however, often eschew the proverbial poker face,
with its blank impassivity disguising any tell, and instead don a mask of
power and privilege, with the license, swagger, and unpredictability that it
affords. Although the police, in fact, have limited authority and legitimacy,
they frequently posture as though they are untouchable—not the lowliest
of the low, of course, but the mightiest of the mighty, and in doing so,
break laws, norms, and sometimes bones. Many police believe that
violence is a necessary application of jugaad justice, one that is forced
upon them by an enfeebled criminal justice system, and that violence, or
at least the threat of it, is an expedient way not only of fulfilling their
mandate but also of strengthening their claims to legitimacy—with might,
quite literally, making right.37 Jauregui observes that “police violence in
[the North Indian state of] U[ttar] P[radesh] is ubiquitous and woven into
the fabric of everyday sociality,”38 and few in Banaras would dispute the
claim.
And yet the police must be careful in how much they bend or break
the law, for there are serious consequences if they overplay their hand. If
36. Numerous books invoking jugaad as a method for innovation, entrepreneurship, or
management have been published in India during the past decade, and while they emphasize jugaad
as a template for frugal innovation, they deemphasize the moral ambiguity that such practices often
entail. E.g., NAVI RADJOU, JAIDEEP PRABHU & SIMONE AHUJA, JUGAAD INNOVATION: THINK
FRUGAL, BE FLEXIBLE, GENERATE BREAKTHROUGH GROWTH (2012); DEAN NELSON, JUGAAD
YATRA: EXPLORING THE INDIAN ART OF PROBLEM SOLVING (2018). In the case of the police, for
example, a jugaad approach to justice isn’t simply “doing more with less.” It involves finding
provisional fixes to morally vexing problems, like the “Dirty Harry Problem,” named for Inspector
“Dirty Harry” Callahan in the film Dirty Harry, who faces a series of inescapable moral dilemmas
about whether “bad” means can be justly or justifiably used to achieve “good” ends. See Carl Klockars,
The Dirty Harry Problem, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 33–47 (1991); see also
DIRTY HARRY (The Malpaso Company 1971).
37. See generally Jyoti Belur, Why Do the Police Use Deadly Force?: Explaining Police
Encounters in Mumbai, 50 BRIT. J. OF CRIM. 320 (2010); Justice Tankebe, In Search of Moral
Recognition? Policing and Eudaemonic Legitimacy in Ghana, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 576 (2013).
38. PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 19, at 90.
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a police officer beats up, arrests, or solicits bribes from the wrong member
of the public, the officer is liable to be beaten up in retribution or even
killed,39 as the Indian police suffer “an outrageously large number of
fatalities.”40 Yet for many the more pressing concern is pleasing one’s
superiors, for if one arrests too many or too few, or isn’t sufficiently
deferential or obsequious to the right people, one is liable to be
reprimanded, suspended, or transferred. Transfers—which allow political
agents to build their own coalitions and destroy those of others—are
perhaps the biggest worry, for every police officer is always subject to
them, and they happen “at a dizzying rate.”41 One officer that Jauregui
interviewed recounts being transferred to a new office five times in five
days and did not even manage “to arrive at several of his new offices
before receiving another transfer order directing him somewhere else
hundreds of miles [away] across the state.”42
Pleasing one’s superiors, however, can be a challenge, for it often
involves very selectively enforcing and not enforcing the law. According
to one officer working outside of Banaras, “Most of the time we are not
registering petty theft. If I registered more cases, I’d be suspended or
transferred . . . I must show there’s no theft.”43 Another officer explains
that state government leaders have a vested interest in disempowering the
police,
Because were we to function properly, and enforce the law, this
would lead to many of their [political leaders’] convictions in court
and would take away their power. So they want to weaken the police,
or at least to keep us weak enough so that they
cannot be touched by the law.44

Keeping the law at bay is, in fact, a serious concern for many
politicians. In the Lok Sabha Elections in 2019, 47% of the winners from
Uttar Pradesh faced serious criminal charges, including murder, attempted
murder, and crimes against women.45
One way that politicians disempower the police is by deploying an
enormous number of them for their own VIP security, using them “as
props in performing their power to the world,” while also reducing them
39. Jauregui, supra note 16, at 644.
40. PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 19, at 107.
41. Id. at 124.
42. Id.
43. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 46.
44. Jauregui, supra note 16, at 661.
45. ASS’N FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS, LOK SABHA ELECTIONS, 2019 UTTAR PRADESH
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND, FINANCIAL, EDUCATION, GENDER AND OTHER DETAILS OF
WINNERS 3 (2019) https://adrindia.org/content/lok-sabha-elections-2019-uttar-pradesh-analysiscriminal-background-financial-education [https://perma.cc/FE2L-FGXQ].
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in the eyes of the public “to yes-men, robotic soldiers serving kingly and
queenly leaders, who are the ‘true’ sources of authority.”46 In a quest for
one-upmanship, politicians routinely jockey to gain ever larger VIP
details, as the number and type of police personnel in one’s entourage is
understood as an index of one’s power.47 In 2019, with more than 20% of
police department positions lying vacant nationwide, 66,043 police
officers—nearly 3.5% of the total police force—were nevertheless
assigned to protect 19,467 VIPs.48 Delhi led the way, with an average of
sixteen personnel protecting each VIP.49
So how does an underpaid, understaffed, and under-resourced police,
who the public distrusts, fears, and mocks for its makeshift approach to
justice and its extortionary tactics, actually function? Jauregui offers a
telling example.50 A man was arrested for “being caught in the act of
illegally severing metal rods and wiring from a fence around a plot of land
several kilometers from the police station, to steal and presumably sell as
scrap.”51 But the police lacked the resources to gather the evidence, which
included “large pieces of wood and steel and wire, and then lug them all
the way down to the judicial magistrate’s office in town for the
arraignment.”52 The station officer was away with the station’s only jeep—
not uncommon considering the state’s 68% shortage of patrolling
vehicles53—and no one had a conveyance big enough to do the job or the
money or authorization to get someone else to do it.
Trying to abide by the “twenty-four-hour rule,” which requires that
a subject in police custody be produced before a judicial magistrate within
one day of arrest, the investigating officer and his cohort decided to take a
jugaad approach to justice. They charged the suspect with
pickpocketing.54 For evidence of his crime, they procured double-edge
razor blades—the tool of choice for many local pickpockets—which were
readily available, inexpensive, and far easier to transport than metal rods
and wiring.55 The false charge was easy for the officers to justify for it
allowed them to present the arrest report, the evidence, and the accused on
time, and “the punishment meted out will be the same, whatever evidence
46. Jauregui, supra note 16, at 659.
47. Id. at 658–60.
48. Id.
49. Deeptiman Tiwary, Bengal, Punjab, Bihar Have Maximum VIPs with Police Security:
BPR&D, INDIAN EXPRESS (Dec. 31, 2020), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/bengal-punjabbihar-have-maximum-vips-with-police-security-bprd-7126957/ [https://perma.cc/CZ75-KF3A].
50. PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 19, at 60–62.
51. Id. at 60.
52. Id. at 60–61.
53. COMMON CAUSE & LOKNITI, supra note 28, at 130–31.
54. PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 19, at 60.
55. Id. at 61.
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is used, since pickpocketing and the crime actually committed both count
under the IPC [Indian Penal Code] as theft.”56 The accused, without
protest, signed the doctored arrest report, and the arresting officer
explained that he was not worried about the accused proclaiming that he
was falsely charged because “every criminal claims innocence and denies
wrongdoing.”57
Justice here is a collective, if not coercive, improvision. The police
are cognizant of the so-called “rules,” which they selectively follow or
circumvent, riffing off one another like skilled musicians in a free-jazz
ensemble, to create a likeness of justice, if not justice itself. Law here is
not enforced, it is bargained for.
So, what does a system like this mean for the residents of Banaras?
In short: Avoid the police so you can also avoid the court system, unless
you want to torment a rival. Nationwide, about 50% of the population
believe the police are lazy, but the situation is more acute in Uttar Pradesh.
According to a report from 2019, nearly 60% of the state’s population is
either somewhat or highly fearful of the police and 75% have paid a bribe
in the past year, with more than 33% of those bribes going to the police.58
And among Indian states, Uttar Pradesh is second to last both in terms of
trusting the police and being satisfied with their performance and dead last
in their sympathy for police working conditions.59 I have frequently been
told that Banaras is overrun by two kinds of crooks, khaki and khadi—
police and politicians, signaled here by their clothing. As one merchant
who has lived his entire life in the bazaar told me, “No one trusts the
police. This is fact.” I have never found a reason to doubt him. In Banaras,
it could be said, the police “fall into the class of the a priori distrusted.”60
II. A SYSTEM BUILT BROKEN
Human Rights Watch called its report about the Indian police Broken
System, but it’s less that the system has become broken than that it was
built broken—it was designed to be disempowered, and “an ongoing social
process of delegitimation of police authority” has kept it that way.61 This
configuration of the police is not unique to India; it is also a hallmark of
certain postcolonial societies that lived through a “police state” and never
want to repeat the experience. Ghana, for example, when it was a British
56. Id. at 62.
57. Id.
58. See generally LOCALCIRCLES, INDIA CORRUPTION SURVEY 2019: REPORT (2019),
https://www.localcircles.com/a/press/page/india-corruption-survey-2019#uttar-pradesh
[https://perma.cc/9JXA-MRF3].
59. COMMON CAUSE & LOKNITI, supra note 28, at 56.
60. PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 43 (1999).
61. Jauregui, supra note 16, at 646.
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colony like India, experienced a form of policing that “had little to do with
serving the community and everything to do with upholding the authority
of the colonial state.”62 The Ghanaian police, much like the colonial state
it tried to legitimate, was understood as “an ‘alien’ institution imposed on
an unwilling but helpless populace,”63 and Ghanaian independence, which
came in 1957, has done little to change that understanding. As
criminologist Justice Tankebe notes,
If it was thought that with political independence the police would
undergo a fundamental restructuring—organisationally and
ideologically—such aspirations were dashed as the police were used
as by successive governments to suppress liberties and political
freedoms . . . [In 2005,] 78.6% of Ghanaians considered the police to
be the most corrupt public institution64 . . . [and] some sections of
Ghanaian society consider police abuse as . . . a fact of life,
inevitable, irresistible.65

In trying to make sense of why “a fundamental restructuring” never
occurred, Justice Tankebe builds on Peter Ekeh’s work on the politics of
postcolonial Africa, which identifies two coexisting publics: the
primordial public, which is “moral and operates on the same moral
imperatives as the private realm,” and the civic public, which “is amoral
and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm
and in the primordial public.”66 According to Tankebe,
The realm of the former is governed by indigenous shared norms and
customs, but the realm of the civic public—inhabited by the postcolonial state and its institutions, including the police—suffers from
weak moral commitment. The reason for this detachment lies in the
legitimacy deficits of the colonial state and the failure of many
Africans to decouple the state from its predecessor. . . . Ekeh further
argues that corruption “arises directly from . . . the legitimation of the
need to seize largesse from the civic public in order to benefit the
primordial public.” The moral economy of corruption within this
civic public thus makes it a respectable crime. Respectable crimes in
this sense are crimes which “while being legally culpable and widely
reproved, are none the less considered by their perpetrators as being
62. DAVID KILLINGRAY & DAVID M. ANDERSON, POLICING THE EMPIRE: GOVERNMENT,
AUTHORITY AND CONTROL, 1830–1940 123 (D. M. Anderson & D. Killingray eds., 1991).
63. Justice Tankebe, Colonialism, Legitimation, and Policing in Ghana, 36 INT’L J.L., CRIME &
JUST. 75 (2008).
64. Id. at 76, 79.
65. Justice Tankebe, Public Cooperation With The Police In Ghana: Does Procedural Fairness
Matter?, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1265, 1280 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
66. Peter Ekeh, Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement, 17
COMPAR. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 92 (1975).
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legitimate, and often as not being [offences] at all. . . .” Thus not only
do such crimes occupy “a grey zone of legality and morality”; further,
“the real borderline between what is [considered an offence] and what
is not fluctuates, and depends on the context and on
the
position
of
the
actors
involved.”67

For Tankebe, the civic public and its institutions, such as the police,
suffer from “legitimacy deficits,” which lead to various forms of
corruption and their justification, and a fluctuating borderline between the
legal and illegal, moral and immoral. These legitimacy deficits originated
in part as an inheritance from the colonial period and have become
exacerbated by perceived injustices of the postcolonial state. But they are
also fueled by the imperatives and sentiments that arise from a primordial
public, whereby individuals understand themselves to have moral
obligations to benefit and sustain an extended network of which they see
themselves as members, and they are emboldened to commit “respectable
crimes” to do so.
The police in Ghana, it might be said, take something of a jugaad
approach to justice, crisscrossing a fluctuating, if not imaginary, line
between right and wrong. But what is especially interesting is that civilian
resistance to police authority comes in large part from abiding in a precolonial public, with an alternate moral economy and an alternate ideology
of legitimation, which offers individuals, especially those who join
together in voluntary associations, “intangible, immaterial benefits in the
form of identity or psychological security.”68 This primordial public offers
a kind of citizenship with rules that govern and foster a shared moral
sensibility, in contradistinction to the amoral civic public, and “[t]he
unwritten law of the dialectics is that it is legitimate to rob the civic public
in order to strengthen the primordial public.”69
A primordial public, or something akin to it, thrives in the bazaars of
Banaras; individuals there share a sense of moral obligation to an extended
trust network, which is cultivated by voluntary associations and
strengthened by a collective recognition that the police and courts are
morally bankrupt. Regardless of the history of this public and the way it
might relate to pre-colonial publics or how it might have been reconfigured

67. Justice Tankebe, Public Confidence in the Police: Testing the Effects of Public Experiences
of Police Corruption in Ghana, BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 301 (2010) (internal citations omitted); Cf.
Justice Tankebe, Public Cooperation with the Police in Ghana: Does Procedural Fairness Matter?,
47 CRIMINOLOGY 1281 (2009).
68. Ekeh, supra note 66, at 107.
69. Id. at 108.
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by colonial governmentality,70 there is now a dominant public in the
bazaars of Banaras that is bound together by a moral code and is in clear
opposition to civic authority. This public has its own laws and
punishments, which are widely accepted and recognized as just, making it
unnecessary, if not perverse, to seek justice from the police and courts,
which are thought to be unjust.
Such a public is not new, and there is a good reason that it has thrived
in Banaras. Banaras has been a center for religion and commerce since the
early centuries of the Common Era, and both have helped inoculate it
against incursions from the state. As the terrestrial home of Lord Shiva,
Banaras tolerates and even encourages the many forms of antinomian
behavior that Shiva embraced. Shaivite ascetics, following Shiva’s
precedent, flaunt rules of purity and propriety, Brahmanical law, and state
law, such as openly smoking marijuana, which is sacred to Shiva but
nonetheless illegal,71 or wandering around naked, with ashes rubbed onto
their bodies as their only clothes. Many of these ascetics, past and present,
have likewise enjoyed “the privilege of self-government under their
‘abbots’ and regional controllers along with relative immunity from
imposts and interference by the rulers’ police officials.”72 Lay followers
of Shiva, as well as the many other gods that are revered in the city, are
less fragrant in their disregard for conventions, but they seem to be
emboldened by the city’s many thousands of temples, large and small,73
which taken together create the impression that the old city is one vast
temple-scape and divine law the only mandate. As such, it is something of
a truism that the city’s residents take great pleasure in breaking rules, with
any sign proclaiming that an activity is “strictly forbidden” (sakht mana
hai), be it spitting, urinating, or overloading a vehicle, taken as an
invitation to do the exact opposite.
Banaras’s commercial power has likewise insulated it from state
interference. During the rise of the East India Company and then the rise
(and fall) of the British Empire, Banaras was the subcontinent’s inland
bank, a repository and lending facility for merchants and rulers throughout
India.74 During this period, the Naupatti banking fraternity, which
consisted of nine families in Banaras, stood at the pinnacle of power and
authority, functioning as financial overlords and unimpeachable arbiters,
70. See generally U. Kalpagam, Colonial Governmentality and the Public Sphere in India, 14 J.
HIST. SOCIO. 418 (2001); see generally Christian Novetzke, Religion and the Public Sphere in
Premodern India, 72 ÉTUDES ASIATIQUES 147 (2018).
71. See generally Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
72. BAYLY, supra note 4, at 223.
73. See Christian Haskett, On Varanasi’s Tiny Temples, 18 S. ASIA MULTIDISCIPLINARY ACAD.
J. 6, 15 (2018).
74. BAYLY, supra note 4, at 126–29.
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with more influence and clout than many local kings.75 The Naupatti
eventually became, in the words of one historian, “a self-perpetuating
oligarchy of status,”76 immune to challenges from insiders and outsiders,
and a bulwark for the city against state intervention. The Naupatti were a
heterogeneous collective made up of brahmans, vaishyas, Jains, and the
like, as well as old and new money. They helped merchants in Banaras
overcome caste and sectarian boundaries so that they too could function
as a collective, making the city a refuge for merchants of all kinds and a
financial superpower and increasing its immunity from incursions of the
state.77 Additionally, at that time, “corporations of townsmen, merchants
and religious specialists developed a new coherence and autonomy
which . . . amounted to a virtual civic self-government.”78 This type of
self-rule fostered in the city’s inhabitants a deep distrust and dislike of
government officials and policies and any outside incursions into local
affairs. To this day, the mercantile community in Banaras continues to be
wealthy, heterogeneous, bound by local forms of solidarity, and for the
most part independent of state oversight, with a kind of “virtual civic selfgovernment” as the predominant law of the land.
III. BAZAAR JUSTICE, JUGAAD JUSTICE
The bazaar, like the police, takes a jugaad approach to justice. Once
again, what counts as legal and illegal are conditioned by authority and
circumstance, both of which are in flux. The ethical rules of the bazaar are
not codified in an official code; they are more tacit than explicit—difficult
even for residents to articulate in propositional form, although they
regulate many aspects of their behavior.79 Moreover, these rules are not
applied equally to everyone in all circumstances; there is no “one law for
all,” either by design or practice.80 Rules may vary according to one’s
gender, stage of life, social class, and religious position, just as they do in
normative Hindu configurations of dharma.81 In the bazaar, law is like a
rivulet of water, adapting to circumstances and obstacles. Being fluid,
however, is not the same as being arbitrary.
75. Id. at 215–17.
76. Id. at 216.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 211.
79. See generally Philip Gerrans, Tacit Knowledge, Rule Following and Pierre Bourdieu’s
Philosophy of Social Science, 5 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 53 (2005).
80. See generally Werner Menski, Indian Secular Pluralism and its Relevance for Europe in
Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 31 (Ralph
Grillo, Roger Ballard, Alessandro Ferrari, Andre J. Hoekema, Marcel Maussen & Prakash Shah eds.,
2009).
81. See generally Ludo Rocher, Hindu Conceptions of Law, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1283, 1284–89
(1978).
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The bazaar law system is much like India’s religious family law
system, which follows a model of shared adjudication within a complex
legal pluralism. According to Gopika Solanki, the state shares its
adjudicative authority for family law with a wide range of actors and
organizations—state and non-state, formal and informal, as well as lay,
civic, and religious—which, in turn, engage in dialogue and negotiation
within and between themselves to construct the law in an ongoing and
iterative process.82 This form of legal heterogeneity, with its
“institutionalization of bargaining and accommodation as state craft,”83
fosters a fluid and evolving notion of the law and likewise promotes
diversity by allowing for a proliferation of ideas about religion, religious
identity, marriage, and divorce. India’s religious family law is created by
“a negotiated, uneven, and ongoing process; slow but holding forth a
promise of structural change from below”84—which is how Solanki
describes the workings of gender equality within this legal system but
which could also be used to describe the legal system itself. Justice is a
work in progress, leading (one hopes) to a more egalitarian future.
In the bazaar law system, justice is likewise a product of dialogue,
negotiation, bargaining, and accommodation, and this legal haggling
shares many similarities with the haggling over the price of commodities,
which is a ubiquitous feature of the bazaar economy. Many commodities
in the bazaar, like fruits, vegetables, and the price of transport, do not have
a fixed price. Instead, there is a price range—a normal haggling range—
and within it the buyer and seller negotiate, asking and bidding back and
forth, until a price is agreed upon.85 Fixing a price simultaneously fixes a
relationship, however temporary. This form of direct negotiation functions
as a training ground for dispute resolution, schooling individuals in the
mechanics of resolving conflicts, making agreements, and building trust.
Haggling, in other words, is not fundamentally antagonistic.86
Instead, it is constitutive of community building and essential for the
creation of the heterogeneous trust networks that make up the bazaar’s
social safety net.87 Because haggling that leads to successful compromise,
as opposed to irreconcilable intransigence, is integral to the proper
82. See generally GOPIKA SOLANKI, ADJUDICATION IN RELIGIOUS FAMILY LAWS: CULTURAL
ACCOMMODATION, LEGAL PLURALISM AND GENDER EQUALITY IN INDIA (Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
83. Id. at xxiii.
84. Id. at 332.
85. Victor C. Uchendu, Some Principles of Haggling in Peasant Markets, 16 ECON. DEV. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 37, 37 (1967).
86. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 28, 29 (1978).
87. Rotman, supra note 6, at 257–61.
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functioning of the bazaar’s economy and legal system, it is incentivized in
a variety of ways. A potential buyer generally does not start haggling with
a seller unless they plan to make a purchase; to begin to haggle is normally
understood as a commitment to negotiate in good faith with the intention
of arriving at a consensus. One may be a hard bargainer, but one is still
expected to compromise, and there is social cost for not coming to an
agreement. Raymond Firth’s observations about haggling among Malay
fisherman are apt:
[M]en who always drive the hardest bargain and will make no
concessions are unpopular. If sellers, some dealers do not go to their
boats; if buyers, some sellers do not welcome them. The reasons for
this are based partly on a rather vague feeling of companionship
between buyers and sellers—they are all members of the same
community and some of them are friends and kinsfolk and they all
have to get a living somehow; and partly on a more real economic
interdependence.88

Likewise, in Banaras, individuals who are unwilling to make
concessions while ostensibly haggling are ostracized. There is a sense of
a “just price,” “bidding properly,” and “a rather vague feeling of
companionship” that encourages people to come to an agreement, “though
a little deception is quite permissible if one can manage it.”89 While Firth’s
hagglers are “all members of the same community”—members, perhaps,
of an ethnically homogeneous middleman group, bound together by
mutual trust that allows for “an alternative to contract law and to the
vertically integrated firm”90—the denizens of the bazaar are far more
heterogeneous. They generally come together informally and voluntarily
in “associational engagements,” creating “a form of cohesion and
solidarity among otherwise unaffiliated shopkeepers and residents” and
building trust where there was none.91 Haggling with shopkeepers, in other
words, is crucial for creating the “wider solidarities”92 that help constitute
the bazaar’s social order and the de facto governing body that maintains
it.
The bazaar also incentivizes haggling by bestowing prestige on those
who do it skillfully. One might find a bargain in a shopping mall, I have
often been told in Banaras, but one creates a bargain in the bazaar, and this
88. RAYMOND FIRTH, MALAY FISHERMAN: THEIR PEASANT ECONOMY 201 (1946).
89. Id.
90. JANET T. LANDA, A THEORY OF ETHNICALLY HOMOGENEOUS MIDDLEMAN GROUP: AN
INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO CONTRACT LAW 361 (1981).
91. Rotman, supra note 6, at 258.
92. Christopher Alan Bayly, Merchant Communities: Identities and Solidarities, in THE OXFORD
INDIA ANTHOLOGY OF BUSINESS HISTORY 99, 117 (2011).

148

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:131

happens through dexterous haggling. By creating bargains, one shows
oneself to be thrifty, and as with shoppers in North London, thrift is
regarded as a form of moral deferment, “instrumental in creating the
general sense that there is some more important goal than immediate
gratification, that there is some transcendent force or future purpose that
justifies the present deferment.”93 While in some cases “thrift is clearly a
simple expression of poverty,”94 a form of frugality as necessity, thriftiness
in Banaras is generally endowed with dignity, even sanctity. Conversely,
overpaying as the result of not bargaining with sufficient savvy is seen as
a kind of moral flaw, a wastefulness bordering on sinfulness.
Furthermore, haggling generally feels good, in part because the act
of haggling is coded as virtuous but also because shopkeepers are skilled
at making customers feel that they have bargained well, or even that the
bargain has been bestowed upon them because of their good reputation.
Issues of reputation are especially important as haggling often “attracts
bystanders,” creating a kind of public performance with ritualized “threats,
counter-threats, meaningful shrugs of the shoulders, grimaces, and
disclaimers of interest” that make the eventual agreement all the more
powerful.95 Additionally, after the parties agree on a price and cease
haggling, a shopkeeper will sometimes offer a customer a small gift,
understood as a token of appreciation, as if to encourage the recipient to
come back and return the kindness by purchasing something once again.
In short, customers are strongly encouraged to haggle, in the abstract
because it helps build trust networks that are essential to the functioning
of the bazaar as a commercial, legal, and social institution, and more
concretely because it allows one to save economic capital while
simultaneously accruing social and symbolic capital.
Punishment in the bazaar law system can be financial, corporeal, or
social, or some combination of the three. Those who are understood to
have broken the law—although what constitutes “the law” in the bazaar
may very well be contested—are often expected to pay a fine. However,
the law is sufficiently fluid that “a fine” might be construed as “a fee” or
even “a bribe,” with “fine” registering moral disapproval, “fee” implying
no moral judgment, and “bribe” a marker of moral coercion.96
Lawbreakers may also be punished physically, paying for their
transgressions with the pain inflicted upon them. This form of punishment
is especially common when the result of perceived lawbreaking is
93. DANIEL MILLER, A THEORY OF SHOPPING 104 (1998).
94. Id. at 136.
95. Uchendu, supra note 85, at 38–39.
96. Michael Sandel, Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning: Why Economists Should Re-engage
with Political Philosophy, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 121, 128–29 (2013).
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grievous, such as a traffic fatality, and when the lawbreaker is an outsider
to the community.
Lawbreakers are also punished with forms of social alienation, much
like the Malay fisherman in Firth’s account who, as a result of making no
concessions, are neither patronized nor welcomed. In Banaras, one’s social
standing is a key indicator of one’s creditworthiness, so to be alienated is
to suffer a loss of credit. Considering the importance of credit for even
basic functioning in the bazaar, to lack credit is to face a kind of social
death, or worse. C. A. Bayly, writing about Banaras in the eighteen and
nineteenth centuries, notes that “there were cases in . . . Benares . . . where
great merchants who had participated in the business of state”—and broke
the unwritten law prohibiting it—”lost their credit and died of
starvation.”97 Even now, a merchant who breaks the laws of the bazaar is
considered untrustworthy, and as with the Nattukottai Chettiar merchant
community in South India, it is likely that “news of his untrustworthiness
would spread rapidly. . . . [No one] would do business with him. A major
part of his working capital and an important and reliable source of liquid
credit would be denied him. He would soon be out of business.”98 In
Banaras, as I note elsewhere:
Stories abound of lawbreakers ostracized not only from the higher
realms of commerce but from the more quotidian realms of sociality,
unable to rent a room or buy a home, get their children into the right
schools or married. Breaking the norms, be they legal or moral,
rendered them functionally excommunicated, with exile the only
logical course of action.99

Yet perhaps the bazaar law system in Banaras is not so, well, bizarre.
Robert Ellickson, in his famous study of how rural ranchers negotiate
property rights in Shasta County, California, observes that “neighbors in
fact are strongly inclined to cooperate, but they achieve cooperative
outcomes not by bargaining from legally established entitlements . . . but
rather by developing and enforcing adaptive norms of neighborliness that
trump formal legal entitlements.”100 In other words, “members of a closeknit group develop and maintain norms whose contents serve to maximize
the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with
97. BAYLY, supra note 4, at 461.
98. DAVID RUDNER, CASTE AND CAPITALISM IN COLONIAL INDIA: THE NATTUKOTTAI
CHETTIARS 128 (1994). For an excellent study of the ways that debt, credit, reputation, and trust are
mobilized in the bazaars of Bananas, see SEBASTIAN SCHWECKE, DEBT, TRUST, AND REPUTATION:
EXTRA-LEGAL FINANCE IN NORTHERN INDIA (2022).
99. Rotman, supra note 6, at 245–46.
100. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4
(1991).
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one another.”101 In the bazaar, too, we find something akin to “adaptive
norms of neighborliness” created by “neighbors” who are brought together
because of their physical proximity with one another, not because they are
ethnically homogeneous or otherwise affiliated.102 As “a close-knit
group,” they recognize the utility of cooperation, or perhaps the social
costs of an ongoing competition, so they want to maximize the welfare of
the collective to which they belong. They do this by maintaining certain
“adaptive norms,” which prioritize a kind of “aggregate welfare” rather
than individual justice, which evolve in a dynamic and almost evolutionary
process, and which are often at odds with the formal judicial system and
its “legally established entitlements.”
The residents of the bazaar, like Ellickson’s rural ranchers, show how
“close-knit non-hierarchical groups can achieve much of the internal order
that legal centralists have regarded as the job of a Leviathan
[government].”103 This means living with some uncertainty, with social
norms trumping legal rules, haggling a necessity, and punishments not
fully predictable, but considering the proliferation and longevity of the
bazaars in Banaras, and across South Asia for that matter, and the ways
they allow for diverse communities to live together peacefully, maybe it is
a bargain worth making.
IV. POSTSCRIPT: BETTER BARGAINING FOR PLEA BARGAINS
The law systems in India and the United States have quite a bit in
common and quite a lot they could learn from one another. There are
parallels between the bazaar law system in Banaras and the way that
neighbors settle disputes in Shasta County, and surely elsewhere in
America, with adaptive norms being developed and enforced through
forms of bargaining and negotiation. And while the criminal justice system
in India might seem like a far-flung outlier, with its jugaad approach to
justice and with both ends and means a compromise, bargaining is also
central to the criminal justice system in the United States, even though
there is much fretting about this fact.
Plea bargaining is the norm, not the exception, in the American
justice system, as most criminal cases are settled without a trial. A very
small percentage of defendants in federal criminal cases go to trial—
around 2%—and “there is even less likelihood of a case proceeding to trial
in state court than in federal court.”104 Instead, most defendants plead
101. Id. at 167.
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id. at 238.
104. Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. Macqueen, Going, Going, but Not Quite Gone: Trials Continue
to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does It Matter?, 101 JUDICATURE 28, 28 (2017).
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guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence; this is plea bargaining—“the
exchange of official concessions for a defendant’s act of selfconviction”105—and roughly 97% of federal criminal convictions and 94%
of convictions at the state level are obtained through them.106 Yet this
exchange of concessions is not especially “official,” considering that “the
real world of plea bargaining is . . . frequently off the record,”107 “all but
unregulated,”108 and not always the best of bargains. Defendants, for
example, have little bargaining power and are susceptible to various forms
of coercion, including “overcharging” prosecutors who bring additional
charges that they know they cannot prove but which increase their leverage
in the plea bargaining process and pressure the defendant to plead guilty.109
Plea bargaining is now intrinsic to our court system, and yet many
deride the idea that justice can result from bargaining; bargaining is for
bazaars, not courtrooms. “The idea of allocating criminal punishment
through what looks like a street bazaar,” note two American law
professors, “has proved unappealing to most outside observers.”110 Many
commentators have applied the same analogy, disgruntled that “the Court
has brought law to the shadowy plea-bargaining bazaar.”111 Another
American law professor, John Kaplan, in an article entitled American
Merchandising and The Guilty Plea: Replacing The Bazaar With The
Department Store, pushes the analogy further:
The plea bargain convinces criminals that the majesty of the law is a
fraud, that the law is like a Turkish bazaar. Just as there is no moral
difference between buyers and sellers, there is no moral difference
between the criminal and his attorney, the prosecutor, the judge, and
the probation officers.112

Kaplan, of course, is not trying to understand the bazaar; he wants to
disparage bargaining as neither just nor justifiable. So, he invokes the
foreign bazaar as a domain governed by fraud, with neither legal nor moral
codes, and he casts the American department store as an embodiment of
105. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979).
106. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1402, 1407 (2012).
107. Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 150, 155 (2012).
108. Id. at 151.
109. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85
(1968); Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming the Law to
Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 191,
197 (2015).
110. Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, Plea-Bargaining as a Social Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1901, 1912 (1992).
111. Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. F. 35, 35 (2012–2013).
112. John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with the
Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (1977).
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honesty, surety, and fixity. I believe Kaplan is wrong here on all counts,
but his analysis also represents a missed opportunity. Plea bargaining is
now pervasive worldwide, primarily because America has exported the
practice to scores of countries, including India, where it officially arrived
in 2005.113 And plea bargaining is rife with inequities, in America and
elsewhere, such that all too often the innocent are coerced into pleading
guilty to avoid the possibility of an even worse outcome if the case were
to go to trial.114 Scholars and activists have offered a bevy of suggestions
to make plea bargaining more just, such as allowing defendants more
options and power in the bargaining process,115 but there are few easy
fixes.
One can imagine why scholars like Kaplan might want to jettison
plea bargaining and vilify the bazaar as the source of the problem. But
what if the bazaar were the source of an answer? The bazaar generally
excels at creating conditions whereby bargaining empowers the
individuals involved, making them feel as though their negotiations were
just, they bargained well, and the bargaining process itself was guided by
a moral sensibility that was worth preserving because it holds together an
otherwise disparate community and helps create a world in which the
community determines the law and how it should be enforced rather than
the police or courts.
Regular haggling in the bazaar also creates a bargaining culture such
that individuals are trained in the arts of compromise, capable of being
advocates, arbiters, mediators, and judges as the situation necessitates.
And although this jugaad approach to justice creates moral instability and
can reify inequities and hierarchies, it also helps prevent moral absolutism
and even moral authoritarianism.
Or do we want to follow the model of the department store and
possibly suffer its fate?
Department stores, just like prosecutors, are often accused of
overcharging, being callous and unjust, and disregarding local norms and
institutions if not undermining them. And their reputations and revenues
have suffered accordingly.116 Nearly forty percent of department stores in
113. Máximo Langer, Conviction Without Trial, and the Global Administratization of Criminal
Convictions, 4 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY I.1, I.4 (2021).
114. RAM SUBRAMANIAM, LÉON DIGARD, MELVIN WASHINGTON III & STEPHANIE SARAGE, IN
THE SHADOWS: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON PLEA BARGAINING 6 (2020).
115. John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 182 (2015).
116. VICKI HOWARD, FROM MAIN STREET TO MALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
DEPARTMENT STORE 190–210 (2015); Lauren Hirsch, Great American Department Store Shakeout—
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the United States have closed since 2016, about half of the remaining
1,600 mall-based locations are expected to close by 2025, and many
predict their imminent demise.117 The bazaar is likely a better model—and
a better bargain.
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